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1. Introduction
In our dreams we can unmoor ourselves from reality: from time, from space, from
who we take ourselves to be. As Lakoff (1972) pointed out, our dreams can even
support at least two counterparts of the dreaming self, one bodily, the other mental:
(1) I dreamt I was Brigitte Bardot and I kissed me. (Lakoff 1972)
Within contemporary understanding of attitude reports, the possibility of a single
proform referencing either counterpart would appear to be simply another manifes-
tation of the de re-de se distinction (Lewis 1979), as well as its attendant linguistic
ambiguities. However, as ﬁrst noted by Percus and Sauerland (2003b), there is a
striking asymmetry in the possible counterparts for the pronouns in (1) – a reading
where the the bodily counterpart kissing the mental counterpart is unacceptable.
(2) [George]: I dreamt I was Brigitte Bardot and I kissed me.
a. Attested reading: In the dream, Brigitte kisses George.
b. Unattested reading: In the dream, George kisses Brigitte
Importantly, this asymmetry vanishes when we consider other attitude predicates,
as in the examples below with hope and pretend.1
(3) John comes late one night, drunk and without his keys. Undeterred, he
smashes through a window and goes up to bed. By morning, he has forgot-
ten the incident, and is shocked to see the back window in pieces. Fearing
that he is being robbed, he runs upstairs to check his safe.
Johni hoped that hei [qua robber] hadn’t yet found hisi [qua mental counter-
part] safe.
This paper owes a great deal to the insight and patience of my dissertation advisors – Danny
Fox, Irene Heim, and Sabine Iatridou. The theoretical approach here is based on joint work with
Feng-fan Hsieh. I have also beneﬁted from discussions with: Oluseye Adesola, Valentine Hacquard,
Victor Manfredi, Norvin Richards, Philippe Schlenker, and especially Kai von Fintel.
1The suppositionals imagine and suppose show this asymmetry. Suppositional say seems not to.
(i) My mother is lying in the hospital after a serious surgery. My brother is constantly urging me
to visit her, but I am too swamped with work. Finally, in exasperation, he starts lecturing me.
My brother: {#Suppose, #Imagine, Say} that youmom were mom and youme won’t visit youmom!
How do you think that would make you feel after all those years of sacriﬁce?
                                                 © 2007 by Pranav Anand 
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(4) My cat, Hobbes, has a particular response that he makes when I call his
name.
I pretended that IHobbes was Hobbes and Ime had just called meHobbes.
This asymmetry bears a striking resemblance to a puzzling interaction Adesola
(2005) noticed between logophoric and non-logophoric pronouns in Yoruba. In ad-
dition to a series of ordinary pronouns (the o forms), in the 3rd person Yoruba also
possesses a series of logophoric pronouns (the o`un forms), which are licensed in the
scope of certain attitude predicates (logophoric environments).2,3 In such environ-
ments, logophors are obligatory de se anaphora – they refer to the attitude- holder
and require a de se construal; they are thus of a type with long-distance anaphora
and obligatorily controlled PRO (Chierchia 1989). Logophoric and ordinary pro-
nouns may co-occur within a logophoric environment, subject to a constraint Ades-
ola discovered: logophoric forms cannot be c-commanded by co-referental ordi-
nary pronouns.
(5) Olui
Olu
so
say
pe´
that
o∗i, j
o
r´
 
see
ba`ba´
father
o`uni
oun-gen
‘Olui said that he∗i, j has seen hisi father. (Adesola 2005: ex. 59a, 213)
Trading logophoric pronouns for mental counterparts and ordinary pronouns for
bodily counterparts, Adesola’s and Percus and Sauerland’s puzzles seem much the
same. In section 2, I will argue that they are the same, namely the following:
(6) de re BLOCKING EFFECT
No obligatory de se anaphor can be c-commanded by de re counterpart.
Why does this constraint hold? And why (in English) in dream environ-
ments and not others? In sections 3 and 4 I will take up these questions. I will argue
that the non-universality of the blocking effect itself diagnoses that multiple routes
to de se construal exist. The literature on de se ascription has seen two kinds of pro-
posals: a conservative approach (Boer and Lycan 1986, Reinhart 1990, Schlenker
2005), which sees de se ascription as de re ascription with a special acquaintance
relation of self-identity; and a “radical” approach (Chierchia 1989, Schlenker 1999,
Huang and Liu 2001, Stechow 2002), which argues that de se ascription involves a
specialized LF conﬁguration, where an operator binds the de se pronoun.
(7) Kaplan wants to put out the ﬁre.
2Predicates that show this include dunnu ‘rejoice’, gba` ‘agree’, be`e`re` ‘ask’, so ‘say’, n´  ‘say’,
ﬁ e`ho´nu´ ha´n ‘protest’, mo` ‘know’, fe´ ‘want’, n´  re`t´  ‘hope’, da`hu`n ‘answer’, kabamo` ‘regret’, gbo´
‘hear’, ro ‘think’, gba`gbo´ ‘believe’, gba`gbe´ ‘forget’, le´r´  ‘boast’, and, interestingly for us, alaa
‘dream’.
3O`un forms are allowed outside of logophoric environments, referring to a topical discourse
referent. This compatible with an enrichment of the analysis given in this paper, in which at the
matrix level the logophoric operator is evaluated with a topical referent. See Anand and Hsieh
(2005), Adesola (2005) for discussion.
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a. SELF-IDENTITY ACQUAINTANCE RELATION
Kaplani wants of himself j, under self-identity, [CP he j puts the ﬁre].
b. BINDING BY AN OPERATOR
Kaplani wants [CP OP j PRO j to put out the ﬁre].
I will argue that both proposals are correct, but for different cases. Ordinary pro-
nouns are interpreted by a self-identity acquaintance relation. Obligatory de se
anaphora, in contrast, are operator bound, giving rise to the De Re Blocking Ef-
fect.4 Being syntactically-bound, de se anaphora obey the syntactic preference for
local binding (Fox 2000). I will argue (following Anand and Hsieh 2005) that
the cause of the De Re Blocking Effect is intervention by a pronoun between the
operator and the anaphor, resulting in a local binding conﬁguration that prevents
the anaphor from being bound by its operator, and hence licensed. Local binding,
whose competitors must be semantically identical, will be argued to be insensitive
to de se interpretation.
But why not then simply use two ordinary pronouns? At the close of section
4, I will tackle this question. Considering data from Mandarin, I will propose that
certain attitude predicates themselves prohibit ordinary pronouns from using the
relation of self-identity, and that dream in English is one such. This, I will suggest
in closing, is what is behind traditional cases of anti-logophoricity (Koopman and
Sportiche 1989), and not a global competition effect.
2. The Data
This section serves to ﬂesh out the empirical paradigm. I ﬁrst demonstrate that
the relevant constraint prohibits any de se pronoun from being in the c-command
domain of any de re pronoun. I then show that this constraint can be obviated by a
focus sensitive-operator. Before continuing, a word on this data. I have encountered
many speakers for whom the blocking effect does not apply. The best diagnostic
I have found to differentiate groups is to choose a de se element that is utterly
incapable of any action, as in the following:
(8) a. # I dreamt I was a little mouse and I startled me.
b. # I dreamt I was a carrot and I was chopping me up for dinner.
c. # I dreamt I was a roaring ﬁre and I sat down to watch my ﬂames play
in the darkness.
The above dreams are somewhat exotic but possible (and surely, in the land
of children’s cartoons, commonplace). The data reported below are the judgments
of 15 English speakers for whom the above examples are simply ungrammatical (or,
4I have argued elsewhere (Anand 2006, Anand and Nevins 2004) for another way of deriving
obligatory de se anaphora involving diagonalization of the context parameter. This method will
not be subject to the De Re Blocking Effect. For evidence that both the operator binding and the
diagonalization method are needed, see Chapters 2 and 3 of Anand (2006).
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pragmatically odd). For the 10 additional speakers who did not report this contrast,
with a rich enough context all of of the examples show full ambiguity. For these
speakers, there is nothing special about dream reports.
2.1. The De Re Blocking Effect
Building on the interpretive asymmetry surrounding (1), Percus and Sauerland (2003b)
demonstrate that when the de re pronoun is further embedded, ambiguity results:
(9) a. I dreamt I was Brigitte Bardot and I kissed me. (Lakoff 1972)
* Brigitte George
b. I dreamt I was Brigitte Bardot and my mother kissed me.
* Brigitte/George George/Brigitte
Based on this, observation, Percus & Sauerland propose that some de se pronoun to
be outside the c-command domain of all de re pronouns. I will now show that this
is too weak – all de se pronouns must be de re-free.
The ﬁrst counterexample is sentence (1) itself, where the ﬁrst conjunct pos-
sesses a de se pronoun that is de re free. To forestall appeals to conjunction reduc-
tion, I present structurally similar examples: disjunction (10) and temporal adjunc-
tion (11), as well an instance where the de re free form is in the same clause as the
de re pronoun (12). For perspicuity, the de se forms have been bolded.
(10) I am a guard at a local jail who is known for his harsh treatment of prisoners.
One night, I am plagued (perhaps by a just God) with dreams that I am one
of the prisoners, and I learn just how terrible I can be.
a. # I dreamed that I had to keep my mouth shut or Idere’d beat me.
b. I dreamed that I had to keep my mouth shut or [mydere shiftmates]
would beat me.
(11) I am going through a messy divorce with a prominent actor, who is being
highly uncooperative. One of my friends suggests that I simply start some
bad PR for her, but another (more ethical) friend is unsure: “How would
you feel if it were you?” Later that night, I dream that am I my wife, and
that I hear rumors about my PR campaign.
a. # I dreamed that before I could even get to a reporter, Idere had already
spread all sorts of lies about me all over the Internet.
b. I dreamed that before I could even get to a reporter, [mydere contacts]
had already spread all sorts of lies about me all over the Internet.
(12) Last night, my “friend” had me over for a gala and sat me next to her. All
she talk about how much her foundation needs responsible donors. When I
got home, ﬁlled with suspicions, I went right to bed, and promptly starting
dreaming that I was her, planning last night’s party.
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a. #I dreamed that I placed medere next to me only so as to squeeze some
money from medere.
b. I dreamed that I placed [mydere namecard] next to mine only so as to
squeeze some money from medere.
The contrast between the pairs above indicate that the de re pronoun c-commanding
the lower de se pronoun is actually a culprit, even though another de se form is de
re free. This indicates that the status of all de se pronouns is at issue.
Precisely the same set of facts holds for ordinary pronouns and logophors
in Yoruba. This was shown earlier in (5) with one pronoun-logophor pair. With an
additional logophor outside the c-command domain of the ordinary pronoun, the
ordinary pronoun still cannot refer to the attitude holder of the logophor:
(13) a. Olui
Olu
so
say
pe´
that
o`uni
oun
ro
think
pe´
that
Ade j
Ade
se`le´r`
 
promise
fu´n
to
o∗i
o
pe´
that
Mary
Mary
lo
go
k`
 
see
ba`ba´
father
o`uni
oun.gen
‘Olui said that hei thought that Ade promised him∗i, j that Mary would
visit hisi father.’
‘Olui said that hei thought that Adek promised himi, j that Mary would
visit hisk father.’
b. Olui
Olu
so
say
pe´
that
o`uni
oun
ro
think
pe´
that
Ade j
Ade
se`le´r`
 
promise
fu´n
to
`
 
ya´
mother
re`i
o.gen
pe´
that
Mary
Mary
lo
go
k`
 
see
ba`ba´
father
o`uni
oun.gen
‘Olui said that hei thought that Ade promised hisi, j mother that Mary
would visit hisi father.’
‘Olui said that hei thought that Adek promised hisi, j mother that Mary
would visit hisk father.’
Finally, we can replicate these facts in Mandarin with ordinary pronouns
and the long-distance anaphor ziji (Zushi 2001, Anand and Hsieh 2005), which also
is obligatorily de se (Pan 1995).5
(14) a. Johni
John
renwei
thinks
Bill j
Bill
gei
give
tai
he
ziji∗i/ j-de
self-POSS
shu
book
‘Johni thinks that Bill j gave himi his∗i/ j book.’
b. Johni
John
renwei
thinks
Bill j
Bill
gei
give
tai-de
he-POSS
mama
mother
zijii/ j-de
self-POSS
shu
book
‘Johni thinks that Bill j gave hisi mother hisi/ j book.’
5In fact, many Mandarin speakers do not show this contrast, revealing another pattern of de se
anaphora which behaves of a type with Zazaki shifted indexicals (Anand and Nevins 2004). See
Anand (2006) for details.
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Thus we see the same constraint in three languages, each dealing with a de
se form and an ordinary pronoun. In English, the two forms are morphologically
identical, but in Yoruba and Mandarin the de se form is an obligatory de se anaphor.
Unlike pronouns in these languages, the logophor and long-distance anaphor must
be interpreted de se. These facts suggest the following generalization:
(15) de re BLOCKING EFFECT
No obligatory de se anaphor can be c-commanded by de re counterpart.
The term “de re counterpart” is self-explanatory for dream pronouns in En-
glish, but it also covers Yoruba and Mandarin ordinary pronouns that are interpreted
de se (which, recall, is in general possible). Thus, even if the o and ta forms in
(13) and (14) are construed de se, co-reference with the logophor or long-distance
anaphor is still blocked. Thus, the De Re Blocking Effect owes not to how the De
Re form is construed, but to what kind of item it formally is (namely, not an oblig-
atory de se anaphor). In English, however, this fact is obscured by morphological
syncretism between de se anaphora and ordinary pronouns.
2.2. Obviating the Effect
The De Re Blocking Effect predicts that no obligatory de se anaphor can be c-
commanded by a de re counterpart. This appears to be true, except for one sys-
tematic exception – when the de re form is focus-marked and in the scope of a
focus-sensitive operator. Thus, a blocking effect (16a) can be eliminated when the
de re form is the correlate of only (16b).
(16) John, Bill, and Sam are competing for Mary’s affection. One night, John
has a dream where he is Mary. In the dream, the men try to convince Mary
of how well they know her by trying to guess her favorite color. Only John
guesses correctly.
a. * John dreamt that hedere guessed his favorite color.
b. John dreamt that only heF dere guessed his favorite color.
A similar obviation of the blocking effect can be seen in Mandarin; the use
of lian...dou ‘even’ with the ordinary pronoun experiencer allows the long-distance
ziji and the pronoun to co-refer:
(17) a. Johni
John
renwei
thinks
Mary
Mary
gen
with
tai
him
jiang-le
tell-PERF
Bill j
Bill
da-le
hit-PERF
ziji∗i/ j
self
‘Johni thinks that Mary told himi that Bill j hit {himself, *himi}.’
b. Johni
John
renwei
thinks
Mary
Mary
lian
even
gen
with
tai
him
dou
DOU
jiang-le
tell-PERF
Bill j
Bill
da-le
hit-PERF
zijii/ j
self
‘Johni thinks that Mary told even himi that Bill j hit {himself, himi}.’
Thus, although there is a constraint requiring all obligatory de se anaphora
in English, Mandarin, and Yoruba to be free of ordinary pronoun/de re forms, this
constraint is suspended in speciﬁc circumstances.
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3. Why the Blocking Effect?
Having established the character of the blocking effect, in this section I will attempt
to locate its source. I will ﬁrst consider two alternatives that have been presented
in the literature, Percus & Sauerland’s original account in terms of Superiority,
which captures the wrong generalization, and Hardt’s (2003) account in terms of
Centering Theory, which I will argue predicts interpretive consequences that are
not apparent. I will then lay out my own proposal based on Fox’s (2000) claim that
binding is sensitive to locality considerations. The section closes with a discussion
of the potential relevance for Principle A of a constraint advanced in this proposal.
3.1. A Superiority Account
Firmly in the Binding by an Operator school of de se ascription, Percus and Sauer-
land (2003b) postulate that the conﬁguration in (7b) arises via Movement of a se-
mantically vacuous pronoun to a head H high in the embedded CP. This in turn, in
line with the translation rules for movement of Heim and Krazter (1998), creates the
relevant operator-variable chain. Additional de se pronouns are then simply bound
by the CP-level lambda operator.
The blocking effect Percus & Sauerland analyze as an instance of superior-
ity: a de re c-commander serves as a closer potential Goal for the Probing head H,
and hence Movement of the lower de se pronoun is blocked by the system.6 Here
is a schematic of the desired LF and associated syntax:
(18) a. I λ f dreamed [CP me λx H I f kissed tx] desired LF
b. I dreamed [CP mex H I kissed tx] syntactic scheme
Percus & Sauerland’s proposal captures their constraint, which was shown
in section 2.1 to be too weak. It is not clear how proposal could be extended to cover
the De Re Blocking Effect without serious modiﬁcations to syntactic assumptions.7
Additionaly, the proposal would require extension to account for obviation of the
blocking effect by focus sensitive operators.8
6This system requires the both pronouns to be indistinguishable from the Probe’s perspective.
Percus and Sauerland (2003b) argue that this is evidenced by their morphological identity. Regard-
less of the merits of this evidence for English, note that it will not carry over to Yoruba or Mandarin.
7One possibility would be that the lowest de se forms moves through all intermediary positions;
cases where de se forms are not in a c-command relation could be a form of ATB without parallelism.
8Focus-marking might featurally distinguish the de re and de se forms. However, obviation also
occurs when the focus-marked item is an additional c-commanding de se form:
(ii) Scenario in (16). The men are as of yet unaware of who has guessed correctly.
John dreamt that (at that moment) only he knew that hedere had guessed his favorite color.
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3.2. A Centering Theoretic Approach
Hardt (2003) links the blocking effect to discourse salience properties as tracked
within the Centering Theory framework (Grosz et al. 1995). Hardt assumes that
any assignment g compatible with a discourse is deﬁned at designated index C and
maps C to the discourse center. The system has two further principles: a Centering
Requirement, mandating that all pronouns referring to the center be marked with
C; second, a Centering Preference, preferring pronouns marked with C. Hardt
demonstrates that this system can derive the basic facts of Dahl’s Puzzle regarding
VP ellipsis containing two pronouns Dahl (1973). The restriction is quite similar
to the De Re Blocking Effect – no strict pronoun can c-command a sloppy pronoun
(Fiengo and May 1994, Fox 2000):
(19) John said he saw his mother.
Bill did to 〈say he saw his mother〉.
a. Bill said {John, Bill} saw John’s mother.
b. Bill said {*John, Bill} saw Bill’s mother.
(20) John said his mother saw him.
Bill did to 〈say he saw his mother〉.
a. Bill said {John, Bill}’s mother saw John.
b. Bill said {John, Bill}’s mother saw Bill.
Hardt proposes that sloppy identity arises when the center shifts between the
antecedent and elided clauses, changing the reference of C-marked forms. Strict-
sloppy pairings are blocked by the Centering Requirement. To allow them, Hardt
proposes that a syntactic expression containing the strict pronoun is moved out of
the antecedent clause, leaving behind its own proform in the VP. Thus, for the Bill-
John pair in (19a), it is the constituent [John’s mother], while for the Bill-John pair
for (20a), it is the VP [saw John]:
(21) a. John1John→C [hisC mother]3 said heC saw e3.
b. Bill2Bill →C said heC saw e3.
(22) a. John1John→C [saw himC]4 said [hisC mother]3 e4.
b. Bill2Bill →C said [hisC mother]5 e4.
In contrast, the strict-sloppy pair in (19b) cannot be derived because there is no re-
ferring expression containing only the subject pronoun. In dream reports the center
shifts to the de se self, and the illicit LF is available, but blocked by the Centering
Preference:
(23) a. I1[I →C] dreamed[xdese →C] IC was B.B. and I1 kissed meC *Centering Preference
b. IC [myC mother]3 dreamtxdese →C IC was B.B. and t3 kissed meC.
This theory accurately predicts that all de se forms must be de re free, but
via LF movement for which there is no semantic evidence. (For simplicity, I present
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VP ellipsis cases.) First, as the XP containing the strict pronoun is moved outside
the intentional domain of the attitude verb, it should be interpreted de re (barring
individual concept-type traces); however, de dicto readings are possible:
(24) Mary and Jane, unmarried sisters, are reminiscing about how they thought
life would turn out like when they were teenagers. Mary loved dating high
school boys her sister’s age.
When they would talk about life ﬁfteen years in the future Mary1 would
always say that her1 husband would be older than her1.
Jane2 would too 〈 say that her1 husband would be older than her2.〉.
Similarly, the moving XP may contain a variable bound by a quantiﬁer
within the elided VP; that is, it fails to be scope trapped. In the case below, the
plural pronoun they must remain in the scope of the quantiﬁer every lobbyist; this
should serve to block the containing relative clause’s scoping out, and hence block
a strict interpretation of the non-lobbyist writer, contrary to fact.
(25) Mary1 said that [every lobbyist]2 thought that the article they1+2 wrote praised
her1 too much. John3 did too 〈say that [every lobbyist]2 thought that the ar-
ticle they1+2 wrote praised him3 too much〉.
Finally, Hardt’s proposal does not address the obviation effects for Dahl’s Puzzle
discussed by Fox.
3.3. A Binding Economy Approach
While I disagree with Hardt’s proposal, I agree with him that there should be a
unifying mechanism for both the De Re Blocking Effect and Dahl’s Puzzle. One
important piece of evidence in this direction is that both can be obviated by a focus-
sensitive operator, as discussed in section 2.2. I will suggest that Fox’s (2000) own
account of the obviation can be carried over to the blocking effect, as long as we
make it insensitive to de se interpretive effects.
Fox argues that Dahl’s Puzzle follows from a theory of binding that enforces
locality under truth-conditional equivalence. Consider the unavailable John-Bill
pair in (19a). This reading requires his to be bound by Bill, which by VP ellipsis
parallelism requires its correlate in the antecedent to be bound by John. Thus, the
illicit reading’s status comes down to whether John can bind his across the co-
referential he. The status of this claim rests on the following two representations:
(26) a. John λx said that hex λy likes hisx mother. non-local binding
b. John λx said that hex λy likes hisy mother. local binding
As the ﬁrst pronoun is bound by John, these two representations are truth-
conditionally equivalent. Fox (2000) proposes that in such cases, a principle of the
Binding Theory rules out the non-local conﬁguration:
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(27) Rule H: A variable, x, cannot be bound by antecedent, α , in cases where a
more local antecedent, β , could bind x and yield the same semantic interpre-
tation. (Fox 2000: 111)
When there is a truth-conditional difference, however, the local represen-
tation is not a competitor for the non-local representation, and hence we should
expect obviation, as indeed occurs.
(28) John believes that only he likes his mother. Bill does too 〈believe that only
John likes Bill’s mother〉.
I would like to pursue this line of explanation. Following Schlenker (1999),
Stechow (2002), I will assume that obligatory de se anaphora are marked with the
requirement that they be bound by an operator (this will be indicated with a su-
perscript log); thus de se anaphora follow the structure in (7b).9 The status of the
unavailable readings are thus determined by the competition between the following
two representations:
(29) I dreamt I kissed me.
a. I dreamt OPlog λx I λy kissed melogx non-local binding
b. I dreamt OPlog λx I λy kissed melogx local binding
Local binding is possible, and hence non-local binding is ruled out. However, local
binding does not meet the syntactic requirements of the de se anaphor, and so that
to is ruled out (this latter step derives the ungrammaticality of logophors and long-
distance reﬂexives in the same conﬁguration). all is as with Dahl’s Puzzle; even
obviation works the same. But for one snag. Given that the intervening de re form
is not the product of the same ascription relation, the two representations above are
not semantically equivalent; in one, the lower pronoun is read de se and in the latter
it’s not. Thus, according to Rule H, the local binding conﬁguration is simply not a
competitor for the non-local representation.
Rather than dooming the enterprise, I take this problem to be teaching us
something rather important about the relationship between de se interpretation and
binding competition – they do not interact. There are two natural explanations that
could be provided for this. First, perhaps the de se distinction isn’t truth-conditional,
as Higginbotham (1992) has suggested. However, I am not certain how this could
be made to work, given that the distinction carves out a coherent class of scenarios.
Another potential account, along the lines of Kehler (1993) and Schlenker (2005),
would be to suggest that it is not truth-conditional equivalence that matters, but
denotational equivalence. Assuming, in line with the SELF-IDENTITY ACQUAIN-
TANCE RELATION camp, that de se and de re readings differ solely in the acquain-
tance relation, de se and de re forms pick out the same person and thus local and
9This is not completely precise. Cases of de se anaphora c-commanded by other de se anaphora
are licit. I assume that the anaphora require binding by an operator with certain features (and vice
versa), and that binding serves to transmit the relevant features to binders that head the sister of the
bound variable; see Schlenker (1999) for an instantiation of such an algorithm.
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long-distance representations would compete. However, this competition would be
divorced from the acquaintance relations for the relevant pronouns, and thus would
treat de se and de re forms entirely the same. Depending on the status of the local
binding conﬁguration, mixed de se/de re readings would be either be possible or
not, regardless of which one c-commanded the other.10
I believe there is something right in the latter potential account, namely
that the two representations are competitors because as far as the matrix world is
concerned, the de se and de re forms do refer to the same person. That is, they
are both Lewis-counterparts of the attitude holder. At this point I will reluctantly
raise this to the level of an axiom, with the hope of deriving it in future research.
The particular instantiation of this claim, due to Danny Fox (p.c.), is that Rule H is
evaluated in models where the Lewis counterpart relation Lw is injective:
(30) Rule H-mod de se: A variable, x, cannot be bound by antecedent, α , in
cases where a more local antecedent, β , could bind x and yield the same
semantic interpretation within any model M ∈ Ξ . (after Fox 2000)
M ∈ Ξ iff ∀x,y,z ∈ De∀w ∈ Ds[(xLwy∧ xLwz)→ y = z]
This will sufﬁce for the purpose of binding competition treating both the
de se and de re forms as denotationally equivalent, even though other modules of
grammar would not.
3.4. Some Suggestive Facts
While the above modiﬁcation to Rule H is admittedly stipulative, I believe its scope
is worth exploring. Below I will consider one additional rule of grammar that ap-
pears to be sensitive to it – Principle A. As Heim (1994) notes, dream counterparts
need not be be pronouns; one may be an anaphor, as in the following case that
naturally reports a dream in which a de se Jesus forgives a de re Lakoff:11
(31) Lakoff dreamt he was Jesus and forgave himself all his sins. (Heim 1994:
ex. 15)
Heim (1994) proposes that de se subjects do not count as accessible SUBJECTS
for Principle A, and hence that the domain for anaphors is extended to include the
matrix clause; hence, anaphors are bound by the matrix subject. However, coun-
terpart split with anaphora occurs even when there isn’t a syntactically present el-
ement in the matrix clause to bind the anaphor. To set this up, ﬁrst note that al-
though obligatorily-controlled PRO is de se in attitudinal contexts, it may antecede
an anaphor that is itself de re interpretation of anaphor bound by PRO:
10Relatedly, Schlenker’s (2005) analysis of obviation cases, based on non-identical acquaintance
relations, would require revision if the asymmetry in the simpler cases were derived.
11Heim notes that with 1st person antecedents, the reﬂexive forms are degraded with mixed read-
ings; Arregui (2007) agrees with intution. I am unsure, given wildly different results from my infor-
mants. I leave this to future research; see Arregui (2007) for a proposal that restricts the possibilities
of de se LFs to 1st person.
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(32) John declares, “I’m going to kill the man kissing my girlfriend in that blurry
video!” That man is him. Johni wants PRO j to kill himselfi.
Rizzi (1986) points out cases of object control where the object is not syn-
tactically present, such as say to. If Heim is right then such cases should only permit
anaphora to receive de se interpretations, as there is no overt potential binder. How-
ever, they fully allow de re interpretations:
(33) a. S1: John says to Luca, “Speak about yourself!”
S2: John says to Luca, “Speak about Luca!”
Gianni
Gianni
(a
(to
Lucac)
Lucac)
ha
have
detto
say-PERF
[di
[to
PROci
PROci
parlare
speak-INF
di
SE
se stessoi]
selfi]
‘Gianni said (to Lucac) PROci to speak about himselfi.’ [
 
S1,
 
S2]
I take such facts as evidence against Heim’s proposal. Instead, I would like to
suggest that Principle A is, like Rule H, invariant to the de se/de re contrast.12
4. A Final Note on Obviation
According to the theory presented in the previous section, obligatory de se anaphora
require operator-binding to receive their interpretation. In contrast, I have suggested
that ordinary pronouns read de se do not. This raises two immediate questions.
First, how then are they read de se? Second, if ordinary pronouns may be read de
se, and they are not sensitive to the blocking effect, why does it arise at all in English
dream reports, since two ordinary pronouns could produce mixed readings? In this
section, I will address each question in turn. I will argue that ordinary pronouns
receive de se interpretation exactly as they receive de re interpretation, but that in
certain environments the de se acquaintance relation is unavailable. I will suggest
that the complement of dream is one of these, and that it thus ﬁts into a larger class
of anti-logophoric environments.
12Given the theory of de re assumed in section 4, for this to work anaphora must provide their
own de re relation, which can hold between de se center and attitude-holder.
(iii) λ i i Johnn wants PRO λD λk λ i′ i′ to kill [[himselfk D] i′],
where D(k)(i′) = k.
That is, the concept-generator maps the de se individual in the world to the relevant (i.e., non-self-
identity) de re concept. While this might make one squeamish, I cannot determine any incorrect
predictions this approach makes. Note that allowing de re concepts of de se terms is also potentially
necessary to allow local binding between OPlog and a de re intervener without forcing the intervener
to be read de se.
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4.1. A Theory of De Re
In the classic theory of Russell (1905), de re ascription follows as the result of
scope-taking of the de re term outside of the relevant intensional domain. Quine
(1956), however, noted that such a theory predicts inconsistency when faced with
instances in which an attitude holder – say Ralph, acquainted with some individual
– Ortcutt – in multiple ways, thinks that each acquaintance is actually to a different
person. Ralph enters thereafter into beliefs about Ortcutt1 and Ortcutt2, eventually
forming beliefs that would be contradictory were he to learn that the two Ortcutts
are the same. In reaction to this puzzle, Kaplan (1969) reiﬁed the acquaintance re-
lations directly into the LF of de re belief, turning attitude predicates into tripartite
relations between an acquaintance relation, an attitude holder, and the res the atti-
tude is about (Ortcutt). In a modern cast, Kaplan’s proposal amounts to claiming
the existence of an individual concept f which evaluates to the res in the matrix
world, but which might evaluate very differently in the worlds of the attitude. That
is, de re ascription a` la Kaplan is de dicto ascription where the de dicto description
is covert and happens to evaluate to the res (the de re condition).
(34) a. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
b. λw.∃ f se[ f (w) = Ortcutt∧∀w′ ∈ DOXRal ph,w[spy( f (w′)) = 1]]
Within such a system, it is not entirely clear what a de se individual con-
cept would be; Reinhart (1990) suggests that it is the indexical ‘I’, but that will
not necessarily evaluate to the attitude holder in the matrix context. Instead, fol-
lowing Lewis (1979), Cresswell (1990), Schlenker (1999), I will assume the basic
intensional type is not worlds, but indices (Lewis 1970, Scott 1970), type κ , where
Dκ = De ×Dτ ×Ds. This allows us to center worlds on correlates of the attitude
state/event as follows:
(35) 〈y, t,w〉 ∈DOXx,i0 iff. w is compatible with x’s beliefs at TIME(i0) in WORLD(i0),
y is who x takes himself to be in w, and t is the time x takes it to be in w.
This technical movement allows us to ﬁnally deﬁne the de se acquaintance
relation f sel f as that concept AUTH such that AUTH(〈y, t,w〉)= y. However, AUTH(i@)
will still be the speaker following conventions for truth (the matrix index will be
copied from the context), not the attitude holder, att. To prevent this, we must
check the de re condition not at the matrix index i = 〈y, t,w〉 but a derived index
i′ = 〈att, t,w〉, which I will designate as i[AUTH(i)/att].
4.2. Introducing Compositionality
While the above complications allow us to capture de se ascription as a species of de
re ascription, they unfortunately do not solve the thorny problem of the Kaplanian
program that it is rather hard to make compositional. After all, it involves divorcing
the res from its clause, making it the argument of the attitude predicate, and replac-
ing it with a covert concept. It is not clear how to do all of that and still ensure that
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a de re ordinary pronoun intervenes syntactically between the de se anaphor and its
operator.
I will adopt the proposal of Percus and Sauerland (2003a), in which the de re
acquaintance relation (i.e., concept) is provided by combining a de re pronoun with
a “concept generator,” a function from individuals to individual concepts. Given
that de re concepts are exhaustive, this function is a bijection, hence a conceptual
cover in the sense of Aloni (2000). Here is a schematic of de re ascription, where
G is the concept generator.
(36)


believe


λG


λ i′


i′ . . .

resP
		


res G
i′

. . . . . .
Note that G is abstracted over; attitude predicates plug in their own con-
ceptual covers, allowing attitude predicates to pick their own types of conceptual
covers. This will be exploited in the next section. Concept generators must satisfy
the de re condition for every individual in their domain. This includes items read
de se, which require a derived index. Hence for each attitude holder, att, a de se
concept generator Gatt(att) = AUTH. We may thus generalize the concept generator
over attitude holders as in (37), leading to the lexical entry for attitude verbs in (38)
(note that in the latter AUTH(i’) saturates the position of OPlog):13
(37) ∀x ∈ De, ∀i ∈ κ , Γ ∈ D〈e,κ〉,ese is in CG iff.
∀y ∈ dom(Γ(x)(i)) Γ(x)(i)(y) is a concept f such that f (i[AUTH(i)/x]) = y.
(38) [[believe]]g=λP〈ese〉,eκtλatteλ iκ . 1 iff.
∃Γ ∈CG[∀i′ ∈ DOXatt,i[P(Γ (x)(i))(AUTH(i′))(i′) = 1]].
4.3. On Anti-logophoricity
If pronouns can be read de se and non-de se, and in ways that are not governed
by the De Re Blocking Effect, then shouldn’t two pronouns be able to produced
the unavailable dream report cases. In principle, yes, and that is precisely what I
13This is also required to capture Kaplan’s acquaintance and suitability constraints (elided in the
main text), which are obviously attitude holder dependent.
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assume occurs in other attitude predicates. How is dream different? Somehow in
its scope ordinary pronouns lose their ability to refer de se.
This is not a problem peculiar to pronouns in dream reports. Alongside lo-
gophoricity, many languages show so-called “anti-logophoric” effects, prohibitions
on non-logophors referring to the attitude holder, as indicated in the examples from
Ewe and Abe below:
(39) a. koﬁ
Koﬁ
be
say
ye`-dzo
LOG-leave
[Ewe]
Koﬁi said hei left. (Clements 1975: ex. 1, 160)
b. koﬁ
Koﬁ
be
say
e-dzo
3S-leave
Koﬁi said she/he∗i, j left. (Clements 1975: ex. 3, 160)
(40) yapii
Yapi
hE
said
kO
kO
O∗i/ j/ni/ j
he
ye
is
sE
handsome
[Abe]
‘Yapii said that hei is handsome.’ (only possible with n) (Koopman and
Sportiche 1989: ex. 66b, 580)
These are reported as ungrammaticalities, but I suspect they show that the
ordinary pronouns must be interpreted non-de se (non-obvious scenarios, to be
sure). Let us provisionally assume this is true, subject to more careful ﬁeldwork.
Now, one inﬂuential proposal (Huang 1994, Schlenker 1999, Saﬁr 2005) would an-
alyze these as cases of lexical blocking – as there exists in these contexts a more
specialized form (the de se anaphor) to cover de se, the more general form cannot.
However, this suggestion simply cannot be cross-linguistically valid, since Yoruba
and Mandarin pronouns do not show anti-logophoric effects.
I would like to propose that what is interfering here is the relevant attitude
predicate. One piece of evidence for this idea comes from the interpretation of
ordinary pronouns in Mandarin rationale clauses. Mandarin rationale clauses are
optionally headable by the directional qu ‘go.’ When they are, pronouns in the
rationale clause must be read strictly non-de se. Thus, in the example below, Bill
must believe the man he is hitting is not his father:
(41) S1: Bill deliberately hit hisdese father last night.
S2: Bill hit his father with a chair (he thought he was hitting the father of
that guy).
Billi
Billi
na
take
yizhi
chair
qu
GO
da
hit
tai
he
de
DE
baba
father
‘Bill took a chair to hit his father [# S1,
 
S2] (non-de se).’
This suggests that the attitude predicate qu (a teleological modal) heading
the rationale clause speciﬁes that no pronoun may refer via a self-identity acquain-
tance relation. Within the theory of de re ascription presented in the previous sec-
tion, attitude predicates quantify over concept generators, and hence may impose
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restrictions on their nature. Qu, it seems, requires a condition that self-identity is
out:
(42) ∀x ∈ De, ∀i ∈ κ , ΓC ∈CG is in CGsel f less iff.
Γ(x)(i)(x) ∈C \{AUTH}, where C is salient acquaintance relations.
If this is true for Mandarin rationale clauses, perhaps it is more generally
what is responsible for anti-logophoricty effects, such as those in Ewe, Abe, and
English dream.
(43) [[dream]]c,i,g = λP〈eκe〉,κtλxe. 1 iff. ∃ΓC ∈CGsel f less[∀i′DOXx,i[P(Γ (x)(i))(i′)=
1]].
A classic test for lexical blocking accounts is to construct a situation where
the specialized form cannot apply, such as cases where one element satisﬁes the
specialized form and another does not, and then test whether quantiﬁcation over
the relevant position allows the general form. The concept generator constraint
account predicts that in English dream reports we should not get ambiguity with
quantiﬁcational subjects. The facts require further study. While ellipsis seems to
force either universal de se or de re interpretation (44a), a similar judgment for
quantiﬁcational subjects (44b) seems less sure with explanatory postscript (44c).
(44) John, Bill, and Sam, three losing candidates, watch George get sworn in.
They each fall asleep. John dreams that he is George, and sees himself down
in the stands, watching the inauguration. Sam dreams that he is a member
of Sam’s campaign, and watches as Sam wins the Presidency. His dream
closes with him looking on as he[de re] gets sworn in. Bill has a similar
dream.
a. Sam dreamed he was President. {Bill, *John} did too.
b. * Each of them dreamed that he was voted President.
c. ?? How egomaniacal of them! Each of them dreamed that he was voted
President, but at least Bill and Sam had the decency not dream it in
the ﬁrst person.
A more serious worry comes from cases with logophors. In general, lo-
gophoric cases are only 3rd person (Schlenker 2003). However, the concept gener-
ator constraint account predicts that anti-logophoricity should also hold for 1st and
2nd person elements:
(45) I said that I was the best diver. [should be strictly non-de se in Ewe or Abe]
This is highly unlikely. While it is possible to argue English-like syncretisms for
1st and 2nd person in these languages, we would then be left requiring explanation
for an overwhelming morphological tendency.14
14Functionally, one account might be that de se and de te are simply the most common uses of 1st
and 2nd person forms, hence less of a need for a distinction along such lines in the morphology.
Pranav Anand16
5. Conclusion
This paper’s main empirical concern was a parallel between restrictions on pro-
nouns in English dream reports, Yoruba logophoric environments, and Mandarin
long-distance reﬂexivization. I argued that these environments all requires special
de se forms to be outside of the c-command domain of any ordinary pronoun (the
De Re Blocking Effect), subject to potential obviation by a focus-sensitive operator.
This obviation effect, shared with Dahl’s Puzzle, led me to propose that the De Re
Blocking Effect arose as a result of binding competition a` la Fox (2000). Such an
account in turn led me to propose that binding competition is insensitive to the de
se distinction, a property which I suggested it shares with Principle A.
The account resulted in a split between ordinary pronouns and obligatory
de se anaphora, a split I argued was motivated by the lack of blocking effects with
two regular pronouns. The difference between English dream reports and other
attitude environments I suggested lay in the peculiarities of the predicate dream,
which I suggested prohibits pronouns in its scope from making use of a self-identity
acquaintance relation, and not global computations over most optimal forms. This
last piece of the puzzle is especially vexing, since it would seem on ﬁrst blush that
there would hardly be the training data to cause so many to converge on such a
complex analysis. Future research, I hope, will shed light on what the learning
theory of these facts is.
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